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Introduction
The literature dealing with global imbalances focused attention on the enigma of the "poor" financing the "rich," as exemplified by the patterns of China's and US current account balances during the 1990s and the early 2000s. 1 The onset of the subprime crisis, its deflationary impact on the US, and the resultant recessionary pressure facing other countries suggests the unsustainability of the previous patterns. 2 We evaluate this conjecture in panel regressions that accounts for the US role as a "demander of last resort," controlling for other variables suggested by the literature. As China would be a key player in the adjustment of global imbalances, we also assess the degree to which Chinese current account patterns are accounted for by our panel regressions, and project possible future Chinese current account paths. WEO (2008) for further discussion and detailed references]. As the US played the pivotal role as the "demander of last resort" during recent decades, it makes sense to add lagged US current account deficits to the list of variables explaining current account patterns of other countries. 3 We identify a large but asymmetric effect of the US role as the demander of last resort: a 1% increase in the lagged US current account deficit is associated with 0.5% increase of current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but with insignificant changes of current account deficits of countries running deficits. Similar 1 Further discussions on the sustainability of global imbalances can be found in Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004) , Cooper (2005) , Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) , Roubini (2006) , Setser (2006) , Edwards (2004 Edwards ( , 2005 Edwards ( , 2007 , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) , Ju and Wei (2007a) , Chinn and Ito (2005) , and Aizenamn and Yi (2008) . 2 See IMF's World Economic Outlook (October 2008) for a discussion of the challenges facing the global economy, and recent current account patterns. 3 Aizenman and Yi (2008) report that during recent years the US current account deficits accented well above half of the global current account deficits.
results apply for other measures of US role as the demander of last resort: a 1% increase in the lagged US imports/GDP is associated with 0.3% increase of current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but with insignificant changes of current account deficits of countries running deficits. We control for all these variables in panel regressions of 69 countries during . Overall, not more than 4/5 of the variation is accounted for by regressions that include fixed effects, and China's fixed effect coefficient is insignificant.
Ranked by their economic impact on China's current accounts (% of GDP), the most important variable is the lagged US current account deficit, followed by its own GDP growth, trade openness, bank credits/GDP, age dependency, net foreign assets/GDP, financial openness, and commodity exports/GDP.
We apply the regression analysis to project the future patterns of China's current account under two extreme scenarios. The first case is where all the conditioning variables would be impacted by one standard deviation shocks during the next six years in ways that would increase China's current account surplus; as would be if a global and domestic boom were to take place. The second scenario is the opposite -all the conditioning variables would be impacted by one standard deviation shocks in ways that would decrease China's current account surplus; as would be the case if a global and domestic recession were to take place.
These two scenarios provide us with a band of plausible future paths. We compare the resultant band with the latest WEO's forecast of Chinese future current account, inferring that the WEO's projections may be overly optimistic, forecasting the continuation of high current account surpluses. We conclude with a discussion of these results.
Data and Estimation
Our data on current account balances and macroeconomic factors cover years . Most of the data (details documented in Appendix A) are taken from the World Development Indicators, the International Investment Positions, the External Wealth of Nations, and the World Economic Outlook, supplemented with Chinn and Ito (2006) 's capital account openness index, Shambaugh (2004) 's pegged exchange rate indicators, and our own calculated deviation from PPP implied by the penn effects [see Aizenman (2008) ] and sudden-stop indicators. 4 In addition, we restrict the sample to countries with at least ten annual observations to allow for panel estimation and subsequent division of the whole sample into sub-periods and country groups. Although we try to include as many countries possible, some variables such as the net foreign asset are available for a limited number of countries. While this set of variables is a variant of those used by Chinn and Prasad (2003) , Gruber and Kamin (2007) , and WEO (2008) , the variables represent the same macroeconomic factors in their studies and are selected to maximize our country coverage. After pooling all the relevant variables, we have 69 countries (of which 21 are OECD, as tabulated in Appendix B).
Following the literature, we use the standard macroeconomic factors to estimate { } 
where CAB it is the current account balances (as % GDP) of country i at time t, and X it-1 is a vector of lagged macroeconomic factors,
is a vector of country fixed effects, and , 1 USA t DEMAND − is the lagged US demand (as % of GDP). The empirical specification is linking the current account to the variables suggested by saving-investment framework, augmented with institutional and policy variables. The innovation is the inclusion of the US demand variable [measured by current account deficits, final consumption, household consumption, and imports (as % GDP)] since the US acted frequently as the demander of the 'last resort.' Another frequently cited notion is that due to the growing size of China, the size 4 For the literature supporting the effects of these macroeconomic factors on the current accounts, see Cavallo and Frankel (forthcoming) for sudden-stop indicators; Helliwell (2004) , Higgins (1998) , De-Santis and Lührmann (2006), and Taylor (2002) for the effect of aging on current accounts; Chamon and Prasad (2007) for the impact of age dependency and saving of households in China; and Chinn and Prasad (2003) , Chinn and Ito (2007) , Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) , and Gruber and Kamin (2007) for standard determinants of the current accounts. of the US current account deficits may impact Chinese ability to run surpluses [see also Aizenman and Sun (2008) ].
5 Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the constructed sample. By comparing the correlations between current account balances (as % of GDP) and the macroeconomic variables of China and other developing countries, we can see several structural differences (i.e. foreign exchange reserves, GDP growth, trade openness). The differences suggest that the Chinese experience could be unique. We will try to account for it, using various estimation techniques and alternative specifications. To make sure all the variables are of the same order of integration, we apply several unit root and cointegration tests. In the first panel of Table 2 , the panel cointegration test of Westerlund (2007) under null hypothesis of no cointegration between current account/GDP and other variables can be rejected by at least one of the test statistics at 1 percent level. 6 For the Chinese series, the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test in the second panel of Table 2 suggests that the null of trend stationary cannot be rejected at appropriate lag for all the variables. 7 In the last panel of Table 2 , we apply to the Chinese series a cointegration test between current account and other variables. The test suggests that the null of cointegration with the current account can be rejected for foreign exchange reserves, GDP per capita, age dependency ratio, trade openness, and US imports. As will be shown shortly, these variables are also the key determinants of current account in our sample.
5 Note that if one takes the saving-glut argument literally, then the causality would be revised.
See Chinn and Ito (2007) for more discussion. 6 The rejection is weak for GDP per capita, GDP growth, and population growth.
7 In contrast to Kwiatowski et al. (1992) test, Dickey-Fuller test cannot reject the null hypothesis that China's and US current accounts/GDP contain a unit root over the sample period; both series are I(1). The residual series from fitting the Chinese series on the US series are not stationary. This may reflect the low power of the test, suggesting that the relationship between the US and China current account balances to GDP cannot be explained by a simple cointegration, in isolation of other conditioning macroeconomic factors. It is also consistent with the conjecture that CA/GDP ratio follows a unit-root process if its value stays within a certain range, but reverts to its long-run equilibrium when the CA/GDP ratio exceeds some threshold values [see Ju and Wei (2007b) ].
Baseline results and alternative specifications
Tables 3 and 4 present our baseline results with annual data. We include the lagged current account since studies using annual data tend to find evidence of serial correlation in the panel. The estimation explains about 80 percent of the current account variation from . The variables appearing robust across the specifications can be categorized by their effects on the current account surpluses as the following:
• Positively -lagged current account, net foreign assets to GDP, 8 domestic credit to GDP, trade openness, sudden stops of capital inflows, US current account deficits, US final consumption, US household consumption, and US imports.
• Negatively --foreign exchange reserves, growth of GDP, and age dependency ratio. Table 4 shows that the impacts of these macroeconomic factors differ between countries running current account deficits (specification [4] ) and countries running surpluses (specification [8] ). Essentially, the influence of the US imports is significant only to the countries running surpluses. To confirm these findings, Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation with non-overlapping panel of 5-year data. We can see that the US imports/GDP is positive and statistically significant (specification [4] in Table 5 ), particularly for the countries running surpluses (specification [8] in Table 6) . 9 We will subsequently use [4] in Tables 3 and 5 ( and [4] and [8] in Tables 4 and 6 ) with US imports/GDP as the preferred specification. Firstly, they offer higher explanatory power than other specifications. Secondly, since we include the lagged US current account, the coefficient estimates will be consistent if the lagged US current account is orthogonal to the lagged own-country current account, which seems unlikely. It would be appropriate to use US consumption or US imports, which may be less endogenous than the US current account deficits. Based on the performance of our 8 The net foreign asset position at time t is the initial position plus the cumulative current account and cumulative net capital gains on cross-border positions. 9 We test the residuals [as suggested in Wooldridge (2002, pp. 274-275) ] and find no serial correlation.
estimation, we will use the US imports/GDP as a measure of US demand in the following sections.
Overall, the estimates are stable across country groups and sample periods, as presented in Tables 7-10 . The frequently cited negative impact of age dependency is significant for the sub-sample of developing countries in the 1995-2006 period, suggesting that the current account adjustment related to demographic change applies beyond the OECD population. We also find that the impact of US demand variables is larger on the current account of developing countries, supporting the enigma of the poor economies financing the rich ones. 10 Using random-effects model as another possible specification, we can see in Table 4 that the coefficient estimate on the US imports/GDP variable continues to be positive and significant on the surplus countries. First, we plot in Figure 2 the country fixed effects from the baseline specification [4] in Table 3 for annual data in the top panel, and from [4] in Table 5 in Table 4 using 1981-2006 annual data, the coefficient estimate of the US imports is .313, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This implies that halving the present US current account deficits/GDP via imports will translate into (2.65% x .313) = .83% reduction of China's current account surpluses/GDP, equivalent to 27.2 billion USD. Using our estimates, we can evaluate the combined effect of a 1% of US GDP import reduction on the balances of all the countries running current account surpluses. We apply specification [8] in Table 4 
Concluding remarks
Our analysis confirms the importance of lagged US current account deficits in explaining the current account patterns of other countries. Our projections of the current account of China in the next six years suggest a range of current account/GDP surplus 12 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Curcuru et al. (2008) note that owing to mismeasurement of net financial inflows, the US current account deficit could have been overestimated by as much as 0.6% per year. The mismeasurement in financial flows and merchandise trade could be even more important to China. A more complete investigation into this issue is beyond the scope of our study.
bounded between 12-14% on the high end, and 1-2% on the low end. In contrast, the latest World Economic Outlook (WEO) is in the range of 10-11%, well above our baseline projections of 6-9%. While we are unable to comment directly on the IMF approach that provided this relative high projection, the deflationary pressure triggered by the US financial crises suggests that the WEO's (October 2008) forecast may be off the mark, possibly because it ignores the global recession impact of the present crisis, and the pivotal role of the US as the "demander of last resort."
Indeed, one may argue that even in the absence of the recent financial crises, the anomaly of large countries growing much faster than the global mean, while running large and growing current account surpluses, leads to instability. This may follow from the global adding-up property, where the sum of all current accounts is zero (up to statistical discrepancies). The above anomaly can continue only as long as the deficit countries that grow, on average, at a much lower rate than China, will accommodate China by the needed increase in their current account deficit/GDP. The US played this role of "demander of last OLS with non-overlapping panels of 5-year data and country fixed effects 5 4 OLS with non-overlapping panels of 5-year data and country fixed effects 3 4 5 6
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